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A framework for identifying Internet information gatekeepers
Emily B. Laidlaw∗
Department of Law, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
Issues of freedom of expression, intellectual property and data protection dominate
debates concerning Internet governance, and the legal responsibility of gatekeepers is
often at the centre of such discussions. A focused analysis is needed on what is
meant by the term and how to identify and differentiate between the various
gatekeepers. This article traces the historical development of the term gatekeeper and
shows how traditional conceptions of gatekeeping are inadequate for the context of
the Internet where gatekeeping primarily involves control over the ﬂow, content and
accessibility of information. A particular type of gatekeeper will be identiﬁed, termed
‘Internet Information Gatekeepers’, which are those gatekeepers that as a result of
their control of the ﬂow of information, control deliberation and participation in
democratic culture. This article will then propose a human rights driven framework
for identifying and differentiating between the various gatekeepers and their levels of
responsibility.
Keywords: gatekeeper; Internet; human rights
We have a broad understanding of the entities that are gatekeepers and what it is about the
Internet that has placed them in this position. These entities include, for example, search
engines, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), high trafﬁc social networking sites and portal
providers. Yet, a focused analysis of what is meant by the term gatekeeper in the Internet
context, but most particularly in the context of viewing the Internet as a democratising
force, is needed to not only conﬁrm that these entities are indeed gatekeepers, but to also
ﬁnd a method for identifying other gatekeepers, and for ﬁnding the boundary between
what is a gatekeeper and what is not. The need for the latter is particularly acute when
one attempts to draw a conceptual line between some hosts of message boards or other
Web 2.0 platforms, and others. What we want to avoid is imposing the same gatekeeping
responsibilities on, for example, ‘John Smith’ blogging about his family adventures, which
friends sometimes comment on in the conveniently pre-fabricated comments section, as on
interactive news sites visited by millions around the world, such as the BBC’s ‘Have Your
Say’ discussion forums. Likewise, while such interactive sites might have many visitors,
they are instinctively different than gatekeepers such as ISPs, which control our very
access to the Internet, or search engines, which organise the information available
online. Thus, an examination of what is meant by the term gatekeeper not only serves a deﬁ-
nitional purpose, but guides the nature and extent of their legal duties. To that end this
article will trace the historical development of the term gatekeeper and explain its
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conceptual inadequacy for the Internet. It will then examine a particular type of gatekeeper,
termed an ‘Internet Information Gatekeeper’ (IIG) and propose a human rights driven fra-
mework for identifying and differentiating between such gatekeepers and their levels of
responsibility.
From cupcakes to Yahoo!
At a very general level gatekeepers are entities that decide what shall or shall not pass
through a gate. What makes gatekeepers unique is that they usually do not beneﬁt from
the misconduct although they are in a position to prevent it, thus shaping a liability
regime around gatekeepers instead of those breaking the rules can at times be more effec-
tive. Sometimes this is because a government’s capacity to regulate a speciﬁc issue might be
limited, while a third party gatekeeper’s capacity to regulate the conduct, whether owing to
resources, information, or authority, might be better. Sometimes the gatekeeping arises
simply by the nature of the activity engaged in. For example, librarians and bookstores
choose which books to order, and where to place them on the shelves. Still other gate-
keepers emerge because of their role in shaping our social worlds. This can be seen with
the media where the gatekeeping metaphor has been used extensively. By selecting what
news stories to run, print or discard, at which time, and in which order, they act as ‘surro-
gates or shortcuts for individual people’s decisions’.1
The term gatekeeping was ﬁrst termed by Kurt Lewin in 1947. He used the term to
describe how a wife or mother was the gatekeeper because of her role in deciding which
foods are placed on the dinner table. However, gatekeeping may be traced back even
further to the tort doctrine of vicarious liability. In what continues to be the most inﬂuential
work on gatekeeping, R.H. Kraakman mainstreamed Lewin’s theory and teased out its roots
in vicarious liability, showing that liability of accountants and lawyers for their clients, and
employers for their employees, was in essence an issue of gatekeeper liability. More broadly
positioned within regulatory studies, gatekeepers are non-state actors with the capacity to
alter the behaviour of others in circumstances where the state has limited capacity to do
same. This is what Julia Black calls decentred regulation, where there is a shift ‘in the
locus of the activity of ‘regulating’ from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the adop-
tion on the part of the state of particular strategies of regulation’.2 This shift in regulation
away from the state raises public law concerns as it can produce an accountability glut con-
cerning fundamental democratic values such as freedom of expression when such non-state
actors take on roles, or share roles with others, which are traditionally reserved for public
actors. As Jody Freeman observes, such gatekeepers are not agents of the state and expected
to serve the public interest, but additionally they are not subject to the norms of profession-
alism and public service one normally ﬁnds imposed on such institutions.3
There are two ﬁelds where the concept of gatekeeper has been most fully developed.
First, in the area of mass media and the role of journalists and press institutions as
gatekeepers who select the stories and information we consume. Second, in the ﬁnancial
services industry the concept of a gatekeeper has been used to describe the monitoring
role of auditors, credit ratings agencies and investment bankers. Whichever area is
discussed, two gatekeeping roles can be identiﬁed:
(1) the gatekeeper that controls access to information, and acts in an inhibitor capacity
by limiting access to or restricting the scope of information; and
(2) the gatekeeper that acts as ‘innovator, change agent, communication channel, link,
intermediary, helper, adapter, opinion leader, broker, and facilitator’.4
264 E.B. Laidlaw
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This recognises that gatekeepers at once can have two roles – one outward-looking shaping
behaviour or perceptions and the other inward-looking by inhibiting behaviour or access.
Recognising such dual purposes transfers well to the Internet environment, where gate-
keepers have the capacity to act both as facilitators of and impediments to democratic
discourse.
In practice, however, the traditional deﬁnitions of gatekeeper have been much narrower
and transfer less well to the networked environment of the Internet. This is because of two
reasons. First, traditional deﬁnitions tend to focus on gatekeepers’ capacity to prevent third
party misbehaviour. Second, the gated (a term introduced by Karine Barzilai-Nahon to refer
to those on whom the gatekeeping is exercised) tend to be treated in static terms with little
attention devoted to their rights. With regard to the ﬁrst, for example, Kraakman’s tra-
ditional deﬁnition is narrowly focused on the liability imposed on gatekeepers to prevent
third-party misconduct. This is replicated in the ﬁnancial services industry, where gate-
keepers are mainly conceived as John Coffee deﬁnes them: ‘an agent who acts as a reputa-
tional intermediary to assure investors as to the quality of the “signal” sent by the corporate
issuer’. In other words, the gatekeeper acts as a voucher for corporate trustworthiness,
enabling investors or the market to then rely on the corporation’s disclosure or assurances.
A broader deﬁnition is used in the media where the term has become a metaphor for the way
the media make decisions about what stories to run or discard and when, and how much
attention to give to the stories once they pass through the initial gate. Most recently,
Pamela Shoemaker deﬁned such gatekeeping as ‘the process of culling and crafting count-
less bits of information into the limited number of messages that reach people every day’.5
However, even such a deﬁnition is targeted to the media’s role as an information publisher
and the debate is simply about the nature and extent of this gatekeeping role.
The online gatekeepers targeted herein are not necessarily nor usually engaged in the
same tasks covered by such traditional deﬁnitions. The concept of gatekeepers as builders
of our social reality resonates when examining the pivotal role certain online gatekeepers
play in shaping our online experience, such as our reliance on ISPs simply to gain
access to the Internet, or our reliance on search engines to sort through the clutter of infor-
mation online. However, there are limits to such parallels. For example, most ISPs are not in
the business of providing users with information, but rather run a business of providing
access to the Internet and possibly hosting services. While media and online gatekeepers
share a common gatekeeping role of information control, some online gatekeepers come
to this role by a more indirect route. ISPs are not exactly CNN or the New York Times,
but neither are they simple telecommunications carriers either.
Indeed, it is this inability to seamlessly draw comparisons between the Internet and
various other media models that has proved the major stumbling block to the development
of a coherent and cohesive gatekeeping model. Early jurisprudential and legislative debates
concerning how to categorise the Internet revolved around whether to categorise interme-
diaries using traditional media models of print, broadcasting and common carrier. In the
USA, for example, under the good Samaritan provision of the Communication Decency
Act 47 U.S.C., Section 230, any service, system or access provider is shielded from liability
for not only failing to act when aware or notiﬁed of unlawful content, but for any steps
taken to restrict access to content. Europe has opted for a notice-and-takedown regime
with Directive 2000/31/EC (the Electronic Commerce Directive). These regimes have
been widely criticised and it is arguable that this is, in part, because the concept of
gatekeeping has not yet been sufﬁciently developed for the digital environment.6
In addition, the static way in which the gated have been treated in traditional gatekeep-
ing literature fails to capture the ﬂuid, dynamic, and unstable environment of the Internet.
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This is because the roles people and institutions play online changes. The technology of the
Internet is generative, allowing the people on whom gatekeeping is exercised to participate
in the sharing of content and code. With generativity one questions the one-way approach of
traditional gatekeeping theory of information from the gatekeeper out to the gated. In a Web
2.0 world the gated are not static, but rather dynamic players in creating and managing the
Internet environment. What this means is that there are an inﬁnite number of possible gate-
keepers and gated, whose roles are ﬂuid and constantly changing, operating in a dynamic
regulatory environment. For example, an individual who runs a blog might be gated by the
terms of service of the blog provider, yet might also man the gates of the comments section
of his or her blog. At the same time the blog might be viewed by few readers, or become so
mainstream that it is read by millions and itself generates ﬁnancial beneﬁts.
Thus far, traditional deﬁnitions of gatekeeping have been used in Internet regulation
scholarship. In Jonathan Zittrain’s earlier work he identiﬁes two kinds of gatekeepers:
ﬁrst, the traditional kind where gatekeepers are enlisted to regulate the conduct of third
parties, and second, the technological kind of gatekeepers, where technology is used to
identify and regulate individuals. His deﬁnition broadly identiﬁes the types of business
activities that move businesses into the position of gatekeepers, describing them as
‘businesses that host, index and carry others’ content’. However, he still relies on Kraak-
man’s traditional deﬁnition of gatekeeping treating them as bodies that can prevent or ident-
ify wrongdoing by third parties. Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley also adopt the Kraakman
approach and focus purely on whether liability should be imposed on gatekeepers, separ-
ating this notion from responsibilities the intermediary might undertake.7 With generativity
Zittrain reconceived the notion of how information is produced, stored, processed and con-
sumed, and the next step is to understand what this means for our traditional conceptions of
regulatory players such as gatekeepers. It is proposed herein that it is not third party mis-
conduct that is at the heart of democracy-shaping gatekeepers, but rather their power and
control over the ﬂow, content and accessibility of information.
Internet gatekeepers
This article differentiates between two types of gatekeepers: Internet gatekeepers, which are
those gatekeepers that control the ﬂow of information, and IIGs, which as a result of this
control, impact participation and deliberation in democratic culture. This thread of infor-
mation control is the key to understanding online gatekeeping, and for the ﬁrst criteria,
we can turn to Barzilai-Nahon’s Network Gatekeeper Theory (NGT), whose theory helps
bring the gatekeeping concept into the networked world.
Barzilai-Nahon was driven to develop NGT because traditional gatekeeping literature
ignored the role of the gated thus failing to recognise the dynamism of the gatekeeping
environment. Most relevant herein is not only was NGT developed speciﬁcally with the
Internet in mind, but it moves gatekeeping from a traditional focus on information ‘selec-
tion’, ‘processes’, ‘distribution’ and ‘intermediaries’ to ‘information control’:
Finally, a context of information and networks makes it necessary to re-examine the vocabulary
of gatekeeping, moving from processes of selection (Communication), information distribution
and protection (Information Science), and information intermediary (Management Science) to
a more ﬂexible construct of information control, allowing inclusion of more types of infor-
mation handling that have occurred before and new types which occur due to networks.8
NGT helps identify the processes and mechanisms used for gatekeeping, and most particu-
larly highlights information control as the thread that ties the various online gatekeepers
266 E.B. Laidlaw
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together. Under NGT, an act of gatekeeping involves a gatekeeper and gated, the movement
of information through a gate, and the use of a gatekeeping process and mechanism. A gate-
keeping process involves doing some of the following: selecting, channelling, shaping,
manipulating and deleting information. For example, a gatekeeping process might
involve selecting which information to publish, or channelling information through a
channel, or deleting information by removing it, or shaping information into a particular
form. Her taxonomy of mechanisms for gatekeeping is particularly useful. The mechanisms
include, for example, channelling (i.e. search engines, hyperlinks), censorship (i.e. ﬁltering,
blocking, zoning), value-added (i.e. customisation tools), infrastructure (i.e. network
access), user interaction (i.e. default homepages, hypertext links), and editorial mechanisms
(i.e. technical controls, information content).
Pursuant to NGT, therefore, online gatekeeping is the process of controlling information
as it moves through a gate, and the gatekeepers are the institutions or individuals that
control this process. However, just because someone is an online gatekeeper does not
mean that they are an IIG in the sense that human rights responsibilities should be incurred.
Traditional approaches see the gatekeeper as somehow uninvolved, or the gated as being
unaffected, at least in the sense that the focus is purely on gated misconduct rather than
gated rights as well. Human rights theory helps ﬂesh out the facilitative aspect of how gate-
keepers work that is missing from such traditional approaches. By incorporating the gated’s
rights into the mix, a fuller picture emerges. Barzilai-Nahon focuses on this as the role of
the gated, while Andrew Murray focuses on this as ‘nodes’ in a polycentric regulatory
environment. Add to that a human rights conception of gatekeeping emphasising the
rights of the gated to freedom of expression, privacy and freedom of association and assem-
bly, and we have a better picture of the complex environment within which we are tasked
with identifying IIGs.
The human rights framework proposed herein depends on the extent to which the
gatekeeper controls deliberation and participation in the forms of meaning-making in
democratic society. Democracy here is conceived of in semiotic terms, meaning that the
public plays an active role in creating and circulating meaning and pleasure. Democracy
has always been embodied in the practices of communication and freedom of expression
has consistently been identiﬁed by the courts as central to democracy. Thus when it is
said herein that the gated have rights and are not just the sources of the misconduct, this
shift in focus incorporates human rights as the driver of gatekeeper responsibility. The
following sections expand on this concept and articulate a framework for identifying IIGs.
Internet information gatekeepers: identiﬁcation
When does a company’s responsibilities go from semi-private, wherein no gatekeeping
function is occurring, to something more wherein a gatekeeping function necessitates
certain responsibilities? When does an entity go from being a gatekeeper to an IIG? We
can say that even individuals running their own blogs act as gatekeepers. They can
accept, reject or delete comments by others, but they are not yet IIGs. It is when the
space for which they intermediate becomes one that facilitates or impedes democratic dis-
course that the entity is a ‘gatekeeper’ for the protection of civil and political rights.
Two things are required for a framework of analysis. First, we must identify what qua-
liﬁes an entity as an Internet gatekeeper. Second, we must identify what elevates such a
gatekeeper to an IIG. As shown above, for the ﬁrst criteria, Barzilai-Nahon’s NGT can
be used. Once an entity has been identiﬁed as a gatekeeper through such an assessment,
it must be determined whether the gatekeeper is an IIG.
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Conceptual basis of Internet information gatekeepers
An IIG is conceptually different than any other online gatekeeper, because it attracts human
rights responsibilities. Whether human rights responsibilities should be incurred and the
extent of the responsibilities depends on the extent to which the gatekeeper controls delib-
eration and participation in the forms of meaning-making in democratic society. This
reﬂects the most mainstream conception of the corporate social responsibility (CSR)
model, which is that businesses are responsible for human rights within its sphere of inﬂu-
ence. Sphere of inﬂuence is a concept articulated in one of the leading CSR instruments, the
United Nations Global Compact:
While the concept [of sphere of inﬂuence] is not deﬁned in detail by international human rights
standards, it will tend to include the individuals to whom the company has a certain political,
contractual, economic or geographic proximity. Every company, both large and small, has a
sphere of inﬂuence, though obviously the larger or more strategically signiﬁcant the
company, the larger the company’s sphere of inﬂuence is likely to be.9
John Ruggie, the special representative to the Secretary General on issues of human rights
and transnational corporations, has suggested that the sphere of inﬂuence approach is pro-
blematic because it focuses on a limited set of rights but with expansive and imprecise
responsibilities. He proposes that instead we focus on all human rights and set out
business-speciﬁc responsibilities in this regard. To that end he suggests that we focus on
the potential and actual human rights impacted, and imposes a requirement of due diligence
on companies. His work will have a dramatic impact on the development of CSR, and
signals there will likely be a shift away from the concept of sphere of inﬂuence.
What is proposed herein, unlike Ruggie’s approach, does not wholly reject the sphere of
inﬂuence notion that has arisen in CSR literature. It does not, however, fall victim to
Ruggie’s criticisms either. The reason is that while human rights are broader than democ-
racy-related rights, the human rights referred to in the context of this article, speciﬁcally the
human rights engaged on the Internet in a democratic culture, are narrow. A broader con-
ception of democracy engages rights such as the right to vote, and it arguably depends on
such rights as the right to life and prohibition of torture. However, when the term human
rights is used herein and when the term IIG is used, the focus is on the right to freedom
of expression, freedom of association and assembly, and the right to privacy. Thus, we
start from the position of speciﬁcally engaged human rights and the issue is identifying
the gatekeepers that impact these rights. The regulation that results would be, as Julia
Black describes it, the ‘outcome of the interactions of networks, or alternatively “webs
of inﬂuence” which operate in the absence of formal governmental or legal sanction’.10
An IIG is an entity, which because of the role it takes on, the type of business it does, or
the technology with which it works, or a combination thereof, has the capacity to impact
democracy in a way traditionally reserved for public institutions. An IIG’s human rights
responsibilities increase or decrease based on the extent that its activities facilitate or
hinder democratic culture. This scale of responsibility is reﬂected not only in the reach
of the gatekeeper but in the inﬁltration of that information, process, site, or tool in demo-
cratic culture. While at this juncture we will not identify what those responsibilities are,
it is necessary to understand that it is a sliding scale to help identify who the gatekeepers
are. Figure 1 represents a typical illustration of the public sphere using concentric circles
to illustrate that a business’s human rights obligations are strongest to its workers where
it has the most inﬂuence, and gradually weaking as its sphere of inﬂuence decreases out
to the supply chain, marketplace, community and government.
268 E.B. Laidlaw
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For the purposes herein the model can be set up in exactly the opposite manner. It is not
thought of in terms that the sphere of inﬂuence lessens as one moves to the outer circles, but
rather that as the democratic impact increases, so does ones’ responsibilities. How does one
as a gatekeeper have a greater or lesser impact on participation in democratic culture? There
are two ways: (1) when the information has democratic signiﬁcance; and (2) when the com-
munication occurs in an environment more closely akin to a public sphere.
Characteristics of Internet information gatekeepers
Keep in mind here the broader deﬁnition of democratic culture, which encompasses more
forms of speech as furthering democracy than reﬂected in traditional human rights jurispru-
dence. This is drawing from the theory of Jack Balkin that the Internet has changed the
social conditions of speech such that promotion of democratic culture is one of its
central purposes. The Internet, he concludes, accentuates the cultural and participatory fea-
tures of freedom of expression:
It is more than representative institutions of democracy, and it is more than deliberations about
public issues. Rather, a democratic culture is a culture in which individuals have a fair oppor-
tunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as individuals. Demo-
cratic culture is about individual liberty as well as collective self-governance; it is about each
individual’s ability to participate in the production and distribution of culture.11
Freedom of expression, like the Internet’s topology, can be described as an interconnected
network; a system of cultural and political interactions, experienced at both individual and
collective levels. Information and communication technologies (ICTs), largely owned by
private companies, allow for participation in such interactions at a level, speed, distance
and cost previously unimagined. For example, by contributing to a message board, a
person uniquely communicates in a many-to-many format to individuals potentially all
over the world. This interaction expands what is meant by democracy beyond the political
to the cultural. What democratic culture does is broaden our conception of what it means for
the Internet to have democratic potential and it recognises that democracy is as much some-
thing experienced as a political structure; it is a way of life inextricably tied up with com-
munity and culture.
Thus, the democracy offered online is not restricted to the notion of representative
democracy, but rather is the broader notion of facilitation and participation in democratic
Figure 1. Sphere of inﬂuence.
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culture, which brings within its ambit cultural participations such as non-political
expression, popular culture and individual participation. Therefore, in assessing the
impact on democratic culture, it is not just political discussions that are heralded and pro-
tected, but any communication which is part of meaning-making in democratic culture.
Celebrity gossip, while titillating, offers little in the way of democratic meaning, yet com-
munity-oriented portals such as www.mumsnet.co.uk might, as well as social networking
sites such as Facebook.
What this means for identiﬁcation of gatekeepers is that at the far end of the scale of
clearly protected speech would be overtly political speech. Historically political speech
is given a preferred position over other forms of expression. Discussing issues pertaining
to the governance of one’s community or country are considered crucial to the healthy func-
tioning of democracy. This can serve as a marker of the most protected form of speech for
which businesses incur the most extensive responsibilities. However, non-political speech
that furthers democratic culture is offered more protection than might have been available in
a traditional conception of democracy. This can be seen with the increasing reliance by indi-
viduals on the Internet to help them cope with major life experiences. For such users, the
Internet is not only an information resource, but a community they can visit to seek
comfort and guidance from others going through similar experiences. For example,
online communities have become an increasingly important resource for cancer patients.
The operators of such message boards, therefore, exercise signiﬁcant power to delete
members and censor content.12 Under a traditional conception of freedom of expression,
such content might be accorded less weight, yet through the lens of democratic culture
such content is more signiﬁcant and its’ gatekeepers in a greater position of responsibility.
Second, it must be reminded that the notion of the public sphere discussed herein is
necessarily relaxed. The Internet is, to borrow from Peter Dahlgren’s description of the
public sphere, ‘a constellation of communicative spaces’. There are multiple spaces,
some private, some public, with opportunities to participate in forms that mimic the real
world, and at other times, with opportunities to participate in new forms of communication.
Most, if not all, of these spaces would fail Jurgen Habermas’ utopian model of the public
sphere, but they do empower participation in democratic life creating a form of self-deter-
mination from below. Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale talk about it in terms of the Inter-
net’s structure. They say:
[The web’s] structure results in a bottom-up ﬁltration system. At the lowest level, a large
number of speakers receive relatively broad exposure within local communities likely com-
posed of individuals with high-intensity interest or expertise. Speakers who gain salience at
the lower levels may gradually gain recognition in higher-order clusters and eventually
reach general visibility.13
While this focuses on speakers, we can think of this also in terms of those who receive infor-
mation. The ‘speaker’ might be a blogger. In a Web 2.0 world, the blogger writes in an inter-
active environment. It is not a one-way communication where the writer is separate from the
gatekeeper and/or the information is received by a static gated. Rather there are multiple
channels of communication. The writer writes, readers comment, information is hyper-
linked, and eventually a blog might become so well known that the conversation
becomes relevant to democratic culture, and the entity becomes a gatekeeper.
As the gatekeepers targeted herein control information, the public sphere enabled or
disabled by such gatekeepers is the environment where information is communicated. In
a participative democracy, this is information that is of democratic signiﬁcance, being
270 E.B. Laidlaw
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
La
id
la
w,
 E
mi
ly
 B
.]
 A
t:
 1
0:
04
 3
0 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
content going closer to the core protected by freedom of expression discussed above, which
by reason of (1) reach or (2) its structure, can be described as a modern public sphere. This
structure, to adopt part of James Bohman’s approach, has two dimensions. First, visitors can
express their views and others can respond. Second, the space is inclusive in that the
communication is to an indeﬁnite audience. Bohman adds that the interaction is in an
environment of free and equal respect, but this is perhaps rather a duty of the gatekeeper
to facilitate, instead of being a quality of the structure itself. If required it would mean
that someone was not a gatekeeper as long as the interaction was disrespectful and
unequal. For example, a blog might not be interactive as comments are not permitted,
and therefore only engages issues as to the right of the gated to seek and receive infor-
mation, but because of its reach to many readers takes on democratic signiﬁcance elevating
the blogger to the level of IIG.
What one can imagine beginning to emerge is represented in Figure 2.
Internet information gatekeepers: a framework
We must then identify what the different levels are in the model. Barzilai-Nahon’s func-
tional approach to gatekeepers is very useful and is partially used to ﬂesh out the model.
The analysis of the democratic impact of gatekeepers is structured as a sliding scale
from macro-gatekeepers down to micro-gatekeepers or vice versa. Figure 3 represents
such an analysis.
At the top-level we have macro-gatekeepers, something various authors seem to recog-
nise using terms such as ‘chokepoint’ or ‘bottleneck’. Barzilai-Nahon refers to them as
‘eternal’ gatekeepers. Bracha and Pasquale implicitly recognise these macro-gatekeepers
when in discussing the same theory of democratic culture used herein they comment,
‘though speakers in the digital network environment can occasionally “route around” tra-
ditional media intermediaries, the giant intermediaries are likely to maintain signiﬁcantly
superior salience and exposure, both on and off the Internet’. It is when they are a
certain size, inﬂuence, or straddle several types of gatekeepers and have strong information
controls, they are macro-gatekeepers. These macro-gatekeepers are not categorised on their
own in any other models. They are distinguished from the other levels because users must
inevitably pass through them to use the Internet and thus engage all aspects of such rights as
the right to freedom of expression. This can be literal as in the case of our reliance on ISPs
for access to the Internet, or ﬁgurative, as is the case of search engines on which we depend
Figure 2. Internet information gatekeepers model – democratic impact.
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to organise the information on the Internet. Such bodies incur the strongest human rights
obligations. In contrast, portals were once macro-gatekeepers, but have since been down-
graded to the next level of authority gatekeepers, because while central to a user’s Internet
experience, they are no longer inevitable to it. A new macro-gatekeeper is likely to be a
mobile phone provider. As mobile phone owners increasingly move to smart phones,
which have pc-like capabilities, mobile phone providers become one of the key gatekeepers
setting the terms of access to and use of the Internet.
At the next level is what Barzilai-Nahon calls authority sites, sites which are high trafﬁc,
and control trafﬁc and information ﬂow. They are, for example, portals and high trafﬁc sites
such as Wikipedia. They too impact all aspects of the rights of freedom of expression,
privacy and freedom of association and assembly. They are identiﬁed separately from
other websites and macro-gatekeepers because they play a signiﬁcant role in democratic
culture, both in reach and in impact on culture, but their use is not an inevitable aspect
of using the Internet. Some of them started out in small capacities with no obligations
and then meteorically shot to the level of authority gatekeeper, attracting human rights
obligations, such as Facebook.
At the base level there are micro-gatekeepers, which are not well-known sources of
information or discussion. They do not necessarily engage all aspects of the rights of
freedom of expression, association and assembly, and the right to privacy. A website
might engage the right to seek/receive information because it is a source of one-way com-
munication of information to the masses, but not the right to speak, because visitors are
unable to leave comments or engage in any interactive discourse. The smaller the reach
the less the right is engaged. In addition, the less the site is of democratic signiﬁcance,
the less of a gatekeeping obligation is incurred. In Barzilai-Nahon terms, these are admin-
istrator sites such as application and content moderators, and network administrators. They
can be designated gatekeepers or take the role of administrator. At its most basic level, there
are no gatekeeping obligations that it does not impose on itself or develop in the commu-
nity. This is where there is the most fuzziness and the categorisation of a website depends on
its function, and in a dynamic environment can change. If one worries that, say, a particular
discussion might elevate a message board’s impact on democratic culture thus instantly and
temporarily inviting obligations, this would not be the case. In that case, it is up to the site to
decide how to be governed. Something more sustained would be needed to shift up a level
Figure 3. Internet information gatekeepers model: webs of inﬂuence.
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from a micro-gatekeeper to a middle-level gatekeeper, or from a simple gatekeeper to an
IIG.
In order for a gatekeeper to qualify as a micro-gatekeeper, the content of the site must
pertain to democratic culture and the space must have attributes of a public sphere in either
reach or structure. For example, this author’s family blog would not qualify as a micro-IIG,
although gatekeeping is exercised, as the information is not of democratic signiﬁcance, it is
read by few people, and it is not structured as an interactive space. However, this author’s
work blog, www.laidlaw.eu, has the potential to be an IIG, although is not one yet, as the
information has democratic signiﬁcance, is read by more people and is structured to allow
user comments, although such comments require approval to be posted. A greyer example
is a website such as www.dooce.com, which started out as a personal blog, but over time
attracted a large audience, which in turn attracted advertisements and revenue for the
author. A clearer example of an IIG is www.hufﬁngtonpost.com, an interactive news
blog followed by millions around the world. It actively invites reader contributions, such
as its ‘Off the Bus’ feature during the 2008 American presidential campaign. Some
reader contributions have broken important stories that have been subsequently picked
up by mainstream media. Awebsite such as Hufﬁngton Post is arguably of such democratic
and discursive signiﬁcance, and with such great reach, that it has moved up a level from a
micro-IIG to be an authority gatekeeper. An illustration exemplifying various gatekeepers is
shown in Figure 4.
Such a model helps pinpoint the gatekeepers along the scale of responsibility to tackle
certain issues such as Internet ﬁltering. In the UK, for example, a body such as the Internet
Watch Foundation (IWF), the industry’s self-regulatory body for addressing unlawful
content, would be a macro-gatekeeper. This is because the content a UK user accesses is
inevitably moderated to a degree by the IWF. The IWF sends its members a blacklist of
child sexual abuse images to be ﬁltered, but the body also makes use of the notice-and-take-
down regime to issue notices for the removal of criminally obscene or incitement to racial
hatred content hosted in the UK. The members themselves are a mix of macro-gatekeepers,
such ISPs, Internet access providers and search engines, and authority-gatekeepers, such as
Facebook and the BBC.14 Such gatekeepers have greater impact on democratic culture thus
invite greater scrutiny as to their responsibilities. Using this model to identify the gate-
keepers for ﬁltering has an additional beneﬁt. It reveals that the dynamics are happening
Figure 4. Internet information gatekeepers model: webs of inﬂuence (examples).
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largely at the outer-reaches of the model, where there is the most democratic impact, invit-
ing greater scrutiny of the regulatory arrangement between these various gatekeepers.
A contrasting dynamic involves users, bloggers and blog providers. A blog provider
such as Google’s Blogger service, has Terms of Service that the blog owner is gated by,
which can include sweeping powers to, among other things, delete the blog. Blogger rep-
resents the type of gatekeeper that on its own would be an authority gatekeeper, but under
the umbrella of Google and the breadth of services it offers, is a macro-gatekeeper. The blog
writer has the power to create and select its content, whether to allow comments, and
whether to delete them. For example, as a result of complaints under the US Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) of copyright infringement, Google deleted a series of popular
music blogs. Some of the bloggers disputed the copyright infringement claims, arguing that
they had been asked to post the music by either the promotional company, record label or
the artist.15 The purpose of this example is not to analyse the issues it raises concerning
copyright or the DMCA. Rather, this incident serves to highlight the value of a human
rights driven framework. By shifting the perspective to the gated’s rights, as argued
herein, the question becomes the democratic signiﬁcance of the blogs. One of the blogs
might be a place, whether as a result of numbers or its structure, which elevates it to
micro-gatekeeper and occasionally to the authority gatekeeper level. Thus users might
have a stronger right to the content of the blog, and the blogger a stronger right against
the blog provider to run his or her blog. In turn, the blog provider might have greater
human rights responsibilities and deletion of the blog require greater regulatory scrutiny.
Shifting the perspective gives a fuller account of the concerns raised by Google’s deletion
of the blogs.
Conclusion
The above framework targets a particular type of gatekeeper termed IIGs, which as a result
of their control over the ﬂow of information, facilitate or hinder deliberation and partici-
pation in democratic culture. Whether a gatekeeper has this impact, and the extent of it
is determined by the gatekeeper’s web of inﬂuence, where a gatekeeper with less impact
on democratic culture incurs less responsibility or may not be an IIG at all, sliding up
the scale to a gatekeeper that has a signiﬁcant impact on democratic culture and incurs
more responsibility. Where a gatekeeper ﬁts on this range, as either a macro-gatekeeper,
authority gatekeeper, or micro-gatekeeper, is determined by the extent to which (1) the
information has democratic signiﬁcance; and (2) the reach or structure of the communica-
tive space. While a simpler model might clearly delineate what qualiﬁes as a gatekeeper
from what does not, such a simple, categorical model would artiﬁcially hive off certain enti-
ties from the gatekeeper label. This artiﬁciality cannot work when taking a human rights
approach to gatekeeping as the human rights impact crosses categories. The consistency
here is in the method for assessing gatekeeper qualities, which then provides guidance
on the scale of human rights responsibilities it attracts.
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